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Abstract 
It is documented that fetal exposure to sexual hormones has long lasting effects on human 
behavior. The second-to-fourth digit ratio (DR) is a putative marker for prenatal exposure to 
testosterone (compared to estrogens) while in uterus, with higher relative exposure to 
testosterone resulting in a lower DR. Although the existing literature documents the correlation 
of DR with various decisions, and testosterone has been related to competitive behaviors, little 
research has studied the effect of DR on competition in conflict situations where skills do not 
matter. We investigate this question in the laboratory. Based on a previously obtained large 
sample of student subjects, we selectively invite subjects to the laboratory if their right-hand DR 
is in the top (High type) or bottom (Low type) tercile for their gender. Unbeknownst to the 
subjects, we perform a controlled match of High and Low types as opponents in a 2-person 
Tullock contest. We find that Low type (higher exposure to testosterone) males expend 
significantly higher conflict effort than High type males, that is, they are more aggressive, which 
reduces their opponents’ earnings. Among females, however, everyone is more aggressive 
against the High type (who respond less aggressively). These results can partially be explained 
through high joy of winning and/or spitefulness for Low type males, and high spitefulness for 
Low type females. This investigation sheds light on the importance of biological aspects in the 
ex-ante determinants of conflict, and on contest design. 
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1. Introduction 
Competition and conflict are closely related aspects of human life. Many competitive scenarios 
offer opportunities to “one-up” or deliberately harm a rival – often leading to the expenditure of 
resources with substantial opportunity cost, as well as escalation through retribution. Vendettas, 
riots, religious or ethnic tensions, as well as bidding wars and protracted legal battles are all 
examples of such situations. To better understand how excessive expenditure of resources can 
arise in these contexts, and how such conflict dynamically affects people’s behavior in 
competition, it is important to understand what leads some people to behave more aggressively 
than others. Heterogeneity of conflictive behavior has various causes, including those commonly 
classed as nurture (e.g., upbringing, social norms, and stereotypes) or situational factors (e.g., 
socio-economic conditions, mental and physiological state). However, some part of it may also 
be determined by nature: some people are born more conflictive than others. In this study, we 
focus on this ex-ante biological aspect. 
More specifically, we focus on how preferences for competition and conflict may develop in 
utero. Biological and psychological studies have shown that differences in fetal exposure to sex 
hormones (testosterone and estrogens) explain behavior in later life (Hines, 2006; Herbert, 2015). 
Our proxy for fetal hormone exposure is the length of the index finger divided by the length of 
the ring finger: known as the second-to-fourth digit ratio (DR), with a higher relative fetal 
exposure to testosterone (FT) resulting in a lower DR (Goy and McEwen, 1980; Manning and 
Taylor, 2001). To investigate DR as an explanatory variable of conflictive behavior, we conduct 
a controlled laboratory experiment with a multi-period 2-player lottery contest (Tullock, 1980). 
Crucially, we investigate how repeated interaction of different FT types affects dyadic 
competition outcomes.  
Based on a previously obtained large sample of DR measures, we selectively invited only High 
(H) and Low (L) DR type subjects to our experiment. Unbeknownst to the subjects, we thus 
performed a controlled match of types as opponents in the contest - as either H-H, L-L, or H-L. 
We define a subject’s type as H (L) if they are in the top (bottom) tercile of the DR distribution 
within their gender. Because DR is sexually dimorphic, its relationship to behavior is more 
meaningful for interactions with a member of the same gender. Moreover, conducting single-
gender experimental sessions has the benefit of controlling for subjects’ expectations of 
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opponents’ gender, to avoid subjects purposely moderating their competitive behavior – e.g., 
males being less competitive in the presence of female subjects (Van Den Bergh and Dewitte, 
2006) or more likely to compete with other males (Gupta et al., 2011). For these reasons, we 
design our experiment as an intra-gender competition for monetary resources.  
We find that L DR-type males expend significantly higher conflict effort than their H type 
counterparts. That is, they are more aggressive. However, they do not necessarily earn more than 
the H type; whereas anybody matched with a L type earns significantly less compared to when 
matched with a H type. When two L type males are matched, we observe the highest individual 
conflict effort and the highest aggregate conflict levels.  
The results are different for the females: overall everyone is more aggressive against H types, 
who appear to respond less aggressively, and L types earn more than H types. While the highest 
conflict effort for females is exerted by L types when matched with H types, matching two L 
types results in the lowest aggregate conflict levels – exactly the opposite as for men. These 
findings can be partially explained through differences in underlying preferences, such as “joy of 
winning” utility and social preferences. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, this is the very first study 
that uses individual information on prenatal exposure to testosterone to match subjects in the 
laboratory, which means our H and L types are defined ex-ante by design. Second, previous 
studies reported a relationship between L DR and success in competitive scenarios (e.g., in 
financial trading, Coates et al., 2009, and sports, Manning and Taylor, 2001). However, these 
studies cannot assess whether L DR individuals prevail due to superior competitive preferences 
or superior skills. Our study uses a contest game where there are no differences in skills. Hence, 
our setup lets us isolate the effects of FT on conflict behavior regardless of the differences in 
personal abilities. Third, we contribute to the contest theory literature incorporating biological 
factors for the first time. Finally, we contribute to the literature on gender differences in 
competition by reporting the surprising finding that males act primarily in accordance with their 
own biological type whereas females react to their rival’s type. 
Viewing competition outcomes as a function of biological types can provide novel explanations 
for patterns observed in markets and society. When certain types are more likely to select into 
certain professions, such as financial trading (Sapienza et al., 2009) or entrepreneurship 
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(Nicolaou et al., 2017), this will affect the nature of the competition. The nature of the 
competition, in turn, may also attract or favor the survival of certain types. Having a type suited 
to a particular competitive environment may be so important as to be part of human adaptive 
machinery: Cecchi and Duchoslav (2018) show that the exposure of pregnant women to violent 
conflict in Uganda has resulted in children born with lower DRs, who cooperate less in a public 
good game. These findings hint at a biological feedback mechanism that may contribute to 
vicious circles in conflict-prone societies. If we are to break such vicious circles, understanding 
the feedback mechanisms that propagate overly competitive or conflictive behavior is of key 
importance. 
Our findings have another practical implication for policymakers and contest designers. 
Asymmetric behavior in conflict or competition results in asymmetric outcomes in terms of the 
likelihood of winning and ex-post payoffs. Our results show that effort provision in such 
competition partly depends on the way people are born. Hence, a designer with objectives such 
as maximizing total effort (e.g., sports), minimizing total effort (elections) or maximizing 
maximum effort (R&D races) may want to consider such biological factor along with any socio-
economic factors while designing a contest. An important tool for a social welfare maximizing 
designer is affirmative action where the designer tries to level the playing field by using 
mechanisms such as head-starts, handicaps, quotas or effort caps (Chowdhury et al., 2019). To 
implement such affirmative action tools effectively, one may want to take biological factors 
(such as the DR) into consideration. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant literature. We 
provide a baseline theoretical benchmark for the experiment in Section 3. Section 4 elaborates 
the experimental design and outlines the main hypotheses. The experimental results are reported 
under Section 5. Section 6 introduces behavioral models to further explain the results based on 
preference parameters, and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Testosterone and DR 
Our main interest is the effect of prenatal exposure of the fetus to testosterone. Besides its 
primary function in the development of male reproductive organs, prenatal testosterone plays a 
key role in the ‘masculinization’ of the fetal brain (Arnold and Breedlove, 1985; Bao and Swaab, 
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2011; Goy and Ewen, 1980; Herbert, 2015), with male fetuses producing, and therefore being 
exposed to, much higher levels of testosterone than female fetuses (Rodeck et al., 1985; Finegan 
et al., 1989). Patients with androgen-related syndromes provide quasi-experimental evidence: 
males with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (unresponsive androgen receptors) have not only 
the outward appearance but also psychological traits characteristic of females; while females 
with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (increased androgen production) display childhood play 
behaviors that are more typical of males (see Hines, 2006; Herbert, 2015). Despite these patients 
receiving postnatal treatments that address hormonal imbalances, the effect on sex-differentiated 
behaviors persists. Moreover, even naturally occurring levels of testosterone are correlated with 
sex-differentiated infant behaviors (Hines et al., 2002; Udry et al., 1995). A key implication of 
this evidence is that prenatal testosterone exposure predicts post-natal behavior in both males and 
females.1 
Our marker of prenatal hormone exposure is the digit ratio (DR). The DR, also known as the 
second-to-fourth DR or 2D:4D, is the ratio of the length of the index finger to the length of the 
ring finger. There is an abundance of evidence on the negative correlation between the DR and 
exposure to prenatal testosterone in humans 2 : e.g., testosterone levels in amniotic fluid 
(Lutchmaya et al., 2004; Ventura et al., 2013), androgen spillovers in dizygotic twins (Van 
Anders et al., 2006), and individuals with androgen-related syndromes (Brown et al., 2002; 
Berenbaum et al, 2009; Manning et al., 2013).3 The DR is a stable proxy - it can be measured 
reliably after 3 months of fetal gestation (Galis et al., 2010; Malas et al., 2006) and is consistent 
throughout childhood and adulthood (Garn et al., 1975; Manning et al., 1998; McIntyre et al., 
2005; Trivers et al., 2006). The DR is sexually dimorphic, i.e., males have lower average DR 
than females (although distributions largely overlap). Due to its stability and relative ease of 
measurement, the DR has become a popular proxy for researchers investigating the effects of 
pre-natal physiology on adult behavior.  
 
																																								 																				
1 Although the evidence is strongly suggestive of testosterone-driven masculinization in utero, it is still unclear 
whether fetal testosterone levels are also related to other factors that affect the child’s upbringing. Note, for 
example, evidence that fetal and maternal testosterone levels are positively correlated (Gitau et al., 2005; but see 
also Rodeck et al., 1985) and a negative correlation between a mother’s DR and the likelihood of having a son (Kim 
et al., 2015). 
2 See Brañas-Garza et al. (2018b) for an extensive discussion. 
3 There is also a growing literature of experimental evidence from non-human mammals (Auger et al, 2013; 
Talarovicova et al., 2009; Zheng and Cohn, 2011). 
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2.2. DR and competitive behavior 
The DR has been shown to correlate with various aspects of competitive behavior outside the 
laboratory. Studies show relationships with psychological measures such as a desire for 
dominance (Neave et al., 2003; Manning and Fink, 2008), aggression (Bailey and Hurd, 2005; 
Benderlioglu and Nelson, 2004; Turanovic et al., 2017), and self-reported competitiveness 
(Bönte et al., 2017). The literature also documents relationships with professional outcomes such 
as performance in athletes (Bennet et al., 2010; Honekopp and Schuster, 2010; Tester and 
Campbell, 2007) and trading styles and profits in financial professionals (Coates and Herbert, 
2008; Coates et al., 2009; Cronqvist et al., 2016). Furthermore, some professions appear to 
attract certain DR types. For example, Sapienza et al. (2009) find that L DR individuals are more 
likely to self-select into financial services jobs and Nicolaou et al. (2017) find the same 
relationship for entrepreneurship. These suggest that interactions in certain markets and 
professions may be more “testosterone-driven”, due to specific DR types both selecting into 
these interactions and prevailing in the long run (Bönte et al., 2016; Dabbs and Dabbs, 2000; 
Coates et al., 2010). 
There is also a substantial literature on correlations of the DR with behavior in economic games 
in the laboratory. Here we will restrict ourselves to the evidence on types of behavior relevant to 
competitive situations. First, we note that the relationship between testosterone exposure and 
social preferences appears complex. Whereas Buser (2012) and Cecchi and Duchoslav (2018) 
report that public good game contributions are lower for L DR types (in line with the hypothesis 
that high-testosterone types are less cooperative), Brañas-Garza et al. (2013) and Galizzi and 
Nieboer (2015) find that dictator game giving is significantly lower for those with H and L DR, 
compared to those with average DR. Brañas-Garza et al. (2019) find no direct correlation 
between DR and dictator game giving, fairness or trust. In contrast, studies on risk taking present 
a more harmonious set of findings. Several studies have documented a negative relationship 
between DR and risk taking with financial incentives (Dreber and Hoffman, 2007; Garbarino et 
al., 2011; Ronay and von Hippel, 2010; Brañas-Garza and Rustichini, 2011; Strenstrom et al., 
2011; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018). Taking risks is a feature of many competitive situations, and 
gender differences have been observed for both preferences over risk (Charness and Gneezy, 
2012; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Eckel and Grossman, 2008) and preferences for competitive 
situations (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). With respect to other factors that may influence 
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competition behavior, we also note that L DR individuals, contrary to expectations, appear to be 
less likely to exhibit overconfidence, at least in tasks where overconfidence is maladaptive 
(Dalton and Ghosal, 2018; Neyse et al., 2016). 
The study closest to ours is the first-price sealed-bid auction experiment by Pearson and Schipper 
(2012), who investigate the correlation between DR and bidding behavior in pairs of subjects 
(stranger matching) in which the gender of the counterpart was unknown (experimental sessions 
contained both males and females). Based on prior research on the relationship of DR with risk 
taking and aggression, they hypothesize that L DR individuals will bid higher amounts. But they 
find no evidence of such a relationship. The authors speculate that such effects may either be 
non-existent or too small, as well as reflecting that “the ‘aggression’ motive may not be present 
in the auction because subjects may view it more like an individual decision task” (p. 526, 
quotation marks in original). Our experimental set-up is arguably more conducive to conflictive 
behavior, by deliberately matching extreme DR types for multiple periods in a partner design, 
conducting single-gender sessions and using a Tullock all-pay contest instead of a winner-pay 
auction. 
Since circulating levels of hormones may correlate to behavior in competition, one remaining 
question of interest is whether there is a relationship between DR and the circulating level of 
testosterone. Although some recent findings (Crewther et al., 2015) suggest a negative 
relationship, pointing at circulating testosterone as a mechanism by which FT indirectly affects 
behavior, there is currently not enough evidence. Part of the issue is the apparent complex role of 
circulating testosterone in competitive settings. Circulating testosterone rises in anticipation of 
competition (Mazur and Lamb, 1980; Suay et al., 1999; Schultheiss and Rohde, 2002) and higher 
circulating testosterone levels are associated with more aggressive behavior (Berman et al., 1993; 
Carre et al., 2008; Kivlighan et al., 2005; Salvador et al., 1999). But the latter findings cannot 
exclude confounding factors and, while several laboratory studies offer some support for a causal 
relationship,4 field studies on testosterone (self-)administration yield mixed evidence (Anderson 
et al., 1992; O’Connor et al., 2002, 2004; Tricker et al., 1996). 
																																								 																				
4 Males after testosterone administration are more likely to respond aggressively to points deducted by a competitor 
in an incentivized real-effort task (Pope et al., 2000); females after administration respond less fearfully and less 
empathetically to angry faces (Van Honk et al., 2012; 2004; Hermans et al., 2006) and take more risk on the Iowa 
gambling task (Van Honk et al., 2004). Studies on the ultimatum game, a paradigm with elements of dyadic 
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2.3. Contest literature 
A unique feature of many situations in competition and conflict is that the agents involved 
expend costly resources such as physical effort, time, or money to win a prize; and irrespective 
of the outcome they lose the resources spent, i.e., the costs are irreversible. The area of game 
theory that investigates specifically this type of games is called Contest Theory. The application 
of this area of research includes, among others, conflict, rent-seeking, innovation races, legal 
battles, and sports. The theoretical basis of contests can be found in books such as Konrad (2009) 
or Vojnovic (2015). An important feature of any contest is the rule that determines how the 
probability of winning depends on the resources (we call it ‘efforts’ in the continuation) spent. A 
function that maps the vector of efforts into probabilities of winning is called a Contest Success 
Function or CSF (Skaperdas, 1996). A CSF, coined by Tullock (1980), considers the probability 
proportionate to the effort spent for each player – similar to a lottery. Due to its theoretical 
tractability as well as applicability in various contest situations, it is one of the most popular 
CSFs.  
Since it is easily implementable in the laboratory and easy for the subjects to understand, the 
Tullock (1980) contest is also the most popular contest used in experimental contest literature 
(Ducheneaux et al., 2015). Researchers have employed this contest to investigate rent-seeking 
(Potters et al., 1989), gender differences (Price and Sheremeta, 2015), group conflicts (Abbink et 
al., 2010), and identity related conflict (Chowdhury et al. 2016) to name a few.  
Two robust phenomena in experimental Tullock contests are ‘overbidding’ and ‘overspreading’. 
Overbidding shows subjects spending more effort (or bidding more) than the level predicted by 
Nash equilibrium (Ducheneaux et al., 2015), whereas overspreading shows subjects bidding with 
higher variation than predicted by the Nash equilibrium (Chowdhury et al., 2014). Several 
behavioral factors, such as joy of winning, errors, social preference and experimental design are 
argued to be responsible for these phenomena (Sheremeta, 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2018).  
 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
bargaining (e.g., Espín et al., 2015) have yielded conflicting results (Cueva et al., 2017; Eisenegger et al., 2010; Zak 
et al., 2009). 
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3. Theoretical benchmark 
As mentioned above, to replicate conflict behavior in the lab, we introduce a Tullock contest 
(Tullock, 1980). There are two identical players. Player 𝑖 (with 𝑖 = 1, 2) chooses his effort 𝑒! ∈ [0,𝐵] from budget 𝐵 to win a prize of common value 𝑉 > 0. There is no prize for the loser 
and, irrespective of the outcome of the contest, players forgo their efforts. The probability that 
player 𝑖 wins, 𝑝!(𝑒!, 𝑒!), is represented by a lottery Contest Success Function: 
                        𝑝!(𝑒!, 𝑒!) = 𝑒!/(𝑒! + 𝑒!)    if 𝑒! + 𝑒! ≠ 0   1/2           otherwise              (1)  
That is, the probability of winning depends on player 𝑖’s own effort relative to the sum of both 
players’ efforts. Given (1), the expected payoff for player 𝑖, 𝐸(𝜋!), can be written as: 
        𝐸 𝜋! = 𝑝!𝑉 + (𝐵 − 𝑒!).            (2) 
It can be shown directly from Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) and Chowdhury and 
Sheremeta (2011) that a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies exists, and it is unique. Following 
standard procedure, the unique Nash equilibrium effort for risk-neutral players is:  
      𝑒∗ =  𝑉/4    𝑖𝑓 𝐵 > 𝑉/4𝐵       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 .                  (3) 
In our experiment we set 𝐵 = 𝑉 > 𝑉/4 to ensure the interior solution and the equilibrium payoff 
is 𝜋∗ = 𝐵 + 𝑉/4. The equilibrium effort remains the same for finite repetition of this game. We 
also set the prize value at 180 tokens, and hence the equilibrium effort is 45 tokens. 
Naturally, this theoretical prediction does not consider any effect of the contestants’ DR. Given 
the literature outlined above, we have framed our experiment neutrally, in terms of ‘bidding for a 
prize’ – where the bids are equivalent to the effort in a conflict. Hence, our experimental 
procedure may elicit effects of DR on bidding behavior and in the next section we provide with 
our behavioral hypotheses. Those hypotheses, however, do not consider through which 
mechanism such outcome may arise. It may be possible that if prenatal exposure to sex hormones 
correlates with key behavioral features, variations in effort provision arises through such features. 
Two of such prominent features uncovered in the literature (e.g., Sheremeta, 2013) are the ‘joy 
of winning’, a psychological value of win over and above the pecuniary value; and social 
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preference – especially ‘spite’, the desire to earn more than the other party’s payoff. We discuss 
these features as well as their corresponding theoretical predictions in Section 6.  
4. Hypotheses and experimental procedure 
4.1. Hypotheses 
Given the literature on the effects of FT on competition-related behaviors we can coin the 
following hypotheses: 
1. A higher FT exposure, reflected by a lower DR should result in more aggressive behavior 
in conflict irrespective of the rival, in the form of higher bids in the experiment – both (i) 
in overall bidding over all periods (ii) as well as bidding in the very first period.  
2. Someone matched with a L-DR opponent should face higher bid and (i) react by bidding 
more irrespective of their own type across all periods, i.e., L DR should face higher bid 
levels; (ii) this should not be the case in the first period bid (as the bid of the other player 
is not observed), i.e., L and H DR should face the same bid level in the first period. 
Whereas Hypothesis 1 comes directly from the DR literature, Hypothesis 2 comes from the 
contest literature where a lagged bid of the opponent often has a positive effect on own bid (see, 
e.g., Chowdhury et al., 2018). These hypotheses are expected to hold especially among males, 
given the literature on (prenatal) testosterone and male-male competition. Previous studies 
suggest that the results may differ by gender (Herbert, 2018).  
4.2. Procedures 
The current study has two distinct innovative aspects: the investigation of conflict behavior and 
its relation to the DR, and the matching mechanism of subjects in the experiment to investigate 
the question. The latter feature is embedded in our experimental procedure. We run six 
treatments in which subjects play exactly the same contest game. The variation, however, comes 
from how the subjects are matched in different treatments. We match a particular DR type (H or 
L) of subject to another without the knowledge of the subjects, and separately for each gender. 
Since we manipulate matching between DR types, ours is not a purely correlational study, in 
contrast to the standards in the DR-behavior literature. Below we explain the matching 
mechanism in detail. 
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Based on a previously obtained large sample of volunteer student subjects (𝑛 = 920), after a 
semester we selectively invited subjects to the experimental laboratory if their right-hand DR is 
in the top (H type) or bottom (L type) tercile for their gender. Unbeknownst to the subjects, we 
performed a controlled matching of H and L types as opponents in a 2-player rent-seeking 
contest. Hence we implemented a 3x2 factorial design {L vs. L, L vs. H, H vs. H} x {Male, 
Female}.5  
Figure 1 displays the distribution of right-hand DRs (left panel for males, right panel for females) 
for all subjects in the initial sample (in grey) and for those finally participating (L-DR in red, H-
DR in blue). Cut points defining the DR terciles are depicted by vertical lines.  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of DR in the initial and final samples: males and females 
 
Notes: Distribution of right-hand DRs (left panel for males, right panel for females) for all subjects in the 
initial sample (in grey) and for those finally participating (L-DR in red, H-DR in blue).	 Cut points 
defining the DR terciles are depicted by vertical lines. 
 
For three of the four subpopulations invited we find no significant difference between the DRs of 
those invited and of those who finally participated. The only significant difference arises for the 
L-DR females: those participating had lower DR than the invited subjects (mean DR: 0.934 vs. 
0.945, p=0.04, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test; all remaining comparisons yield p>0.15). 
																																								 																				
5 The DR distribution is different for males and for females: the mean (SD) DR in our final sample is 1.010 (0.020) 
and 0.994 (0.013) for H type females and males, respectively, whereas it is 0.934 (0.024) and 0.925 (0.020) for L 
type females and males, respectively. Thus, we do not match subjects of different gender.  
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Each subject took part in only one session of a 15-period contest while fixed-matched with 
another subject. In each treatment each subject was given 180 tokens per period from which s/he 
could bid for a prize of 180 tokens. Players could enter bids up to one decimal place.  
Table 1 summarizes the treatment details and number of observations. Note that “Eqbm bid” 
refers to equilibrium bid. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Treatments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All experimental sessions were run at the Behavioural Research Lab at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE), following an experimental protocol approved by the 
LSE Research Ethics Committee. Subjects were students at the LSE. 
We recruited the subjects in two stages. First, subjects were recruited from the Behavioural 
Research Lab’s subject pool for an experiment without any eligibility criteria or exclusion 
restrictions. During this experiment, subjects performed a photo rating task, completed a 
questionnaire and took part in three incentivized preferences elicitation tasks: a time preferences 
task, a single-player dictator game (described in Galizzi and Nieboer, 2015) and a lottery choice 
task (Brañas-Garza et al., 2018). For this experiment, subjects were paid a participation fee plus 
the money they had earned in the preference elicitation tasks.  
At the end of the experiment, we led subjects into a separate room where we had set up a 
computer with a high-resolution scanner (Canon LIDE 110). Subjects were asked to read an 
informed consent form, in which we explained the procedure of obtaining the DR by scanning 
both of their hands, and were explicitly informed this was voluntary and that they could ask as 
Treatment Budget / 
period  
Players 
/ group  
Prize 
value  
Eqbm.  
bid 
Total 
subjects 
Male-L-L  180 2 180 45 16 
Male-Mixed 180 2 180 45 34 
Male-H-H  180 2 180 45 20 
Female-L-L  180 2 180 45 22 
Female-Mixed 180 2 180 45 24 
Female-H-H  180 2 180 45 28 
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many questions as they wanted. If the subject agreed to provide a DR measure by signing the 
informed consent form, our research assistant scanned both hands to obtain the DR. The ID code 
assigned by the subject recruitment system (SONA) was used to identify scans, thus ensuring 
complete anonymity for the subjects. These experiments took place in February and March 2014, 
followed by an extra round of data collection in April 2015. In total, we obtained DR scans for 
704 subjects (478 females). 
Before the second stage, we computed the right-hand DR of each subject following the 
procedure of Neyse and Brañas-Garza (2014). We then grouped subjects by gender and ranked 
them according to their DR. Within each sample, we categorized subjects into 3 terciles 
according to their DR: H, Medium and L. Approximately a semester after collecting their DR, 
we invited only the subjects with H and L DR back to the laboratory for our rent-seeking contest 
experiment. The invitation for this experiment was sent through the LSE subject recruitment 
system and followed the standard invitation format. Specifically, the email did not mention (i) 
any detail of the experiment, (ii) that participation in the contest experiment was restricted to 
those with H and L DR and (iii) that only subjects who had participated in the earlier experiment 
were invited or (iv) that only same gender subjects were to be matched. Thus, there was no 
indication that any of our subjects suspected that the invitation was contingent on their earlier 
participation, or in any way related to the DR measure they had provided. Our final sample 
consists of 70 male and 74 female subjects (see Table 1 for details). 
In what follows we will refer as L (H) to L (H) DR type subjects. For each session, which were 
always of same-gender, we recruited equal numbers of H and L types. Using the ID code 
assigned by the subject recruitment system, we could identify a subject’s type upon arrival at the 
laboratory. After taking note of the numbers of H and L types present, we randomly allocated 
subjects to a computer cubicle in the laboratory. By asking subjects to provide their ID code in a 
computerized questionnaire at the start of the experimental session, we identified which 
computer cubicles had a H type and which cubicles had a L type. This information was crucial 
for the next step: matching L and H types in the 2-player contest according to our experimental 
design. 
In our experimental design, subjects played fifteen periods of the same contest game with 
anonymous fixed (partners) matching. To ensure sufficient anonymity in the laboratory, sessions 
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with lower sign-up rates of H and L types were supplemented with ‘filler’ subjects that did not 
attend the first stage sessions (and for which we do not have a DR measure). 
Each subject participated in only one session and had not participated in a contest experiment 
before. Instructions were read aloud by an experimenter. Subjects were paid the combined 
earnings of five randomly chosen periods (with an exchange rate of 2 tokens for £0.01). All 
subjects in a session were paid for the same five periods. Before the payments were made, 
subject demographic information was collected through an anonymous survey. Each session took 
about 1 hour and average earnings per subject were £14.96. 6 
5. Results 
To economize on notations, in the continuation the variables referring to the case of a H type 
playing against another H type are denoted as 𝐻𝐻 and those referring to of a L type against a L 
type are denoted as 𝐿𝐿. Similarly, for mixed pairs the variables referring to a H type when 
playing against a L type are denoted as 𝐻𝐿 and those referring to a L type against a H type are 
denoted as 𝐿𝐻.  
Furthermore, we use Ø to refer to the aggregation of L and H types. Specifically, the case of L 
(H) type players when playing against either type (that is, independent of the opponent’s type) is 
denoted by 𝐿Ø (𝐻Ø), whereas the aggregation of both types (that is, independent of the decision-
maker’s type) when playing against L (H) type players is denoted by Ø𝐿 (ØH). 
5.1. Aggregate behavior 
We start by reporting the aggregated bid expended by the subjects, separated by matching 
category (treatment) and by gender. The top panel of Figure 2 shows the Kernel density function 
for the aggregate data over the 15 periods: 𝐿𝐿  (in solid red), 𝐻𝐻  (in solid blue), Mixed 
(aggregating 𝐻𝐿 and 𝐿𝐻: in dotted orange) for males and females separately. The lower panel 
shows the same for only the first period – in which there were no history or experience of 
interaction.   
																																								 																				
6 We also ran an additional 15-period Tullock contest, for which we re-matched the subjects. The data from this 
additional contest is out of scope for the current study and, crucially, subjects did not know about the second contest 
until after the first contest had completed. Hence, for the purpose of this paper we will consider only the first part of 
the experiment (15 periods before the rematch) and no filler subjects. 
15 
	
As can be seen in the top panel of the figure (all periods), among males there is a peak at around 
45 for HH pairs, which coincides with the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bid. The peak, however, 
is at around 90 for LL pairs. Thus, whereas HH pairs create relatively less overbidding 
(compared to the Nash prediction), LL pairs generate a larger amount of overbidding. Mixed 
pairs bids are somehow in the middle with dual mode near 45 and near 90. Among females, 
different patterns arise. HH shows notably high overbidding, similarly to Mixed pairs (both with 
peaks at around 90), while LL results in a bimodal distribution with peaks at around both 45 and 
90. Average bids (Table 2) support all these observations.7  
Note that an average high or low bid over the 15 periods may arise both due to one’s own 
competitive disposition as well as a reaction to the opponent’s bidding behavior. To tease out the 
response part, we also plot the bids distribution considering only the very first period in Figure 2 
and provide with the same descriptive statistics in Table 2. The bottom panel of Figure 2, 
showing only the first period, replicates the result individually for males; i.e., LL pairs bid more 
than HH pairs. But the bid distribution is not much different for the different pair types among 
females. 
Figure 2. Distribution of bids across conditions: Males and females  
	
																																								 																				
7 Interestingly, the average bids of females are above those of males for HH and Mixed pairs but not for LL pairs. In 
the literature on contests, it is a common finding that females overbid more than males (Sheremeta, 2013). However, 
note that our design is not appropriate to analyze aggregate gender differences because one-third of the population 
(the central tercile of DR) is missing. However, our results indicate asymmetric gender effect of FT on bidding. 
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Note: The top plot refers to all 15 periods collapsed, whereas the bottom plot refers to 
only the first period. In both plots, the left panel displays the kernel density of bidding 
for males across the three treatments (HH, Mixed, LL), whereas the right panel displays 
the same for females. The dashed vertical line shows the Nash Equilibrium bid, 45. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 are broadly in line with the observations from Figure 2. 
Furthermore, the table shows that L DR males bid more than H DR males (i.e, LØ vs. HØ) in the 
first period and overall. The difference between the mean bids of L and H DR males is in fact 
nearly identical when considering either the 15 periods or only the first one (i.e., about 13 tokens 
difference). That difference seems to be milder for females. As expected, for both males and 
females, there is no apparent difference in the first period bids when playing against the L and H 
DR individuals (i.e., ØL vs. ØH). But overall, L DR males seem to face larger bids than H DR 
males, whereas the result is the opposite, and the difference is stronger, for females. 
The observations above indicate that even without interaction there seems to be an effect of FT 
on conflict behavior, in particular among males. For females, however, the effect of FT appears 
to be indirect and arising as the interaction develops: different DR types face different overall 
bids from their opponents. To understand this better, we further look at the dynamic behavior 
and conduct regression analyses to assess statistical significance. 
As discussed earlier, the aggregate behavior is a mix of (among others) the direct effect of FT on 
conflict behavior and an indirect effect coming through the reaction to the rival’s behavior. We 
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investigate this in three steps. First we analyze bidding behavior, then we look at the absolute 
outcomes of the contest, finally we investigate the relative outcomes for the mixed pairs. 
 
Table 2. Average (standard error) of bids 
 Males Females 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐞 𝐀𝐥𝐥 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐝𝐬 𝐅𝐢𝐫𝐬𝐭 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐝 𝐀𝐥𝐥 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐝𝐬 𝐅𝐢𝐫𝐬𝐭 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐝 𝐋𝐋 83.63 (9.04) 62.94 (9.76) 66.26 (8.37) 67.27 (8.98) 𝐇𝐇 61.26 (7.86) 52.35 (9.38) 79.35 (6.67) 66.68 (6.62) 𝐌𝐢𝐱𝐞𝐝 71.10 (5.77) 68.53 (6.75) 79.02  (6.90) 64.30 (7.89) 𝐋𝐇 73.40 (6.31) 75.88 (7.85) 88.16 (7.56) 69.69 (7.22) 𝐇𝐋 68.80 (6.91) 61.18 (10.82) 69.88 (7.32) 58.92 (14.01) 𝐋Ø 78.51 (5.37) 69.61 (6.28) 77.21 (6.21) 68.13 (6.31) 𝐇Ø 65.03 (5.22) 56.41 (7.09) 74.62 (5.09) 64.35 (6.23) Ø𝐋 76.21 (5.67) 62.03 (7.25) 68.07 (5.81) 64.32 (7.60) Ø𝐇 67.33 (5.15) 63.16 (6.48) 83.76 (5.11) 67.58 (5.09) 
Notes: Robust SE clustered at the pair level are in parentheses. 
5.2. Bidding behavior 
Figures 3 and 4 show the dynamics of bidding behavior for males and females. First we discuss 
the behavior of different types (irrespective of the rival) and behavior against different types 
(irrespective of the decision maker’s type), and then we move to the specific treatment pair-types.  
The top right panel refers to the comparison between 𝐿 and 𝐻 decision makers (𝐿Ø vs. 𝐻Ø), 
regardless of the opponent’s type. The bottom right panel refers to the comparison between 𝐿 and 𝐻 opponents (Ø𝐿 vs. Ø𝐻), regardless of the decision maker’s type – i.e., how overall subjects 
behave against type L or type H, irrespective of their own type. The left panel displays the mean 
bids in each of the four possible conditions (𝐻𝐻,𝐻𝐿, 𝐿𝐻, 𝐿𝐿). The small-embedded figures 
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display the corresponding mean bid collapsed across periods (analogous to Figure 2 and Table 2 
above). In all cases, the horizontal axis cuts the vertical axis on the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium 
(i.e., bid=45).  
Figure 3. Dynamics of mean bids (males) 
 
Note: Top right panel compares bidding of L (LØ) vs. H (HØ) decision makers. Bottom right panel 
compares bidding when the decision maker’s opponent is L (ØL) vs. H (ØH). Left panel displays bidding 
across the four conditions (HH, HL, LH, LL). Small-embedded figures show mean bids collapsed across 
periods (error bars display SEM clustered at the pair level). 
On average, overbidding is observed for every treatment. However, this is a robust phenomenon 
in contest experiments (Ducheneaux et al., 2015; Sheremeta, 2013); and in the following we 
focus on the effects of DR type and treatment pair for each gender.  
Focusing on the right panels of Figure 3, note (in line with earlier observation) that among males, 
L types bid more than the H types. This is true overall as well as for the very first period. This 
lends support for Hypothesis 1 that FT exposure makes males more aggressive in a conflict.8 
Note also that the bids against type L and H are similar to each other in the first period, although 
L rivals seem to trigger slightly higher bids than H rivals when considering all periods. Hence, 
combining we observe considerable support for Hypothesis 2 as well for males. 
The left panel in Figure 3 provides with further intuitions. LL pairs bid more than their HH 
counterparts – both overall as well as in the very first period, supporting Hypothesis 1. But the 
consistent higher bids level for LL (compared to HH) also shows consistent responsive behavior 
against high or low bid levels. The bids of the mixed pairs are in between.  
																																								 																				
8 We provide statistical tests with GLS regressions and a formal result below. 
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For females, the results are more complex. Observe in the right panels of Figure 4 that the bids 
by L types are not very different from those of H types – both in the first period as well as 
overall. However, bids against the H type are higher than bids against the L types overall, in 
clear contradiction with Hypothesis 2. Understandably, the bids against different types are not 
different in the first period since the opponent’s behavior can only affect one’s own behavior as 
the experiment develops. Furthermore, whereas L females show higher bids than H females in 
mixed pairs (i.e., LH vs. HL), the HH pairs bid more than the LL pairs – indicating strong 
responsive behaviors. 
Figure 4. Dynamics of mean bids (females) 
 
Notes: Top right panel compares bidding of L (LØ) vs. H (HØ) decision makers. Bottom right panel 
compares bidding when the decision maker’s opponent is L (ØL) vs. H (ØH). Left panel displays bidding 
across the four conditions (HH, HL, LH, LL). Small-embedded figures show mean bids collapsed across 
periods (error bars display SEM clustered at the pair level). 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively for males and females, investigate bidding behavior using a random-
effects GLS regression with robust standard errors clustered on pairs. Results are consistent with 
figures above. Indeed, in the case of males, L types bid significantly more than H types 
(MLØ=78.51, MHØ=65.03, p=0.04 in column 1, i.e., controlling only for time trend)9. Males also 
bid more when paired with a L compared to a H opponent, but not significantly so (MØL=76.21, 
MØH=67.33, p=0.18). Thus, we find considerable support for both Hypothesis 1 and 2 among 
males. For females, there is no significant difference in bidding between L and H decision 
makers (FLØ=77.21, FHØ=74.62, p=0.62) although, in line with Hypothesis 1, L types bid slightly 
																																								 																				
9 This difference does not reach significance when considering only the first period although the coefficient is 
identical (coeff=13.4, p=0.17; OLS), probably due to a lack of statistical power. 
20 
	
more. Yet, females bid significantly less against L than against H opponents (FØL=68.07, 
FØH=83.76, p<0.01), in sharp contrast to Hypothesis 2.  
Table 3. Individual bids as a function of DR types (males) 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dep var: bidt 
      LØ (vs. HØ) 
 
13.408** 12.137 7.116* 6.118 9.270** 4.007 
  
(6.464) (9.805) (3.791) (4.909) (4.171) (4.794) 
ØL (vs. ØH) 
 
8.814 7.543 3.000 2.003 2.263 -3.170 
  
(6.497) (10.192) (3.742) (5.087) (4.447) (5.373) 
LØ x ØL 
  
2.688 
 
2.120 
 
11.127 
   
(16.250) 
 
(7.755) 
 
(8.191) 
bidt-1 
   
0.392*** 0.392*** 0.364*** 0.359*** 
    
(0.055) (0.055) (0.061) (0.060) 
partner bidt-1 
  
0.186*** 0.186*** 0.163*** 0.161*** 
    
(0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.043) 
win prizet-1 
  
-6.205** -6.193** -7.831*** -7.852*** 
    
(2.502) (2.506) (2.884) (2.874) 
age 
     
-0.212 -0.137 
      
(0.511) (0.500) 
intuitive 
     
9.491** 8.718** 
      
(4.762) (4.384) 
risky 
     
-1.784 -3.061 
      
(3.947) (4.099) 
BMI 
     
-0.518 -0.689 
      
(0.514) (0.486) 
period 
 
0.326 0.326 -0.064 -0.063 -0.121 -0.119 
  
(0.443) (0.443) (0.288) (0.288) (0.332) (0.334) 
Constant 
 
58.069*** 58.653*** 29.594*** 30.073*** 48.039** 54.100*** 
  
(6.800) (8.012) (5.102) (5.846) (19.006) (17.794) 
chi2 
 
5.411 5.501 159.677*** 216.927*** 247.894*** 258.038*** 
N 
 
1050 1050 980 980 812 812 
Notes:	 Random-effects GLS estimates: LØ = 1 if the decision maker is L, = 0 if H, regardless of the 
opponent’s DR type; ØL = 1 if he is playing against a L, = 0 if H, regardless of his own DR type; intuitive = 1 
if above median # of intuitive responses in the CRT; risky = 1 if above median in preferences for risk; BMI = 
body mass index. Robust standard errors clustered on pairs are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
The interaction between the decision maker’s type and the opponent’s type (LØ x ØL) is 
insignificant for both males (p=0.87, column 2) and females (p=0.47). This means that, for 
either sex, the effect of the decision maker’s type on bids is similar when playing against L and 
H opponents, whereas the effect of the opponent’s type is similar among L and H decision 
makers. 
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In our next model specification, we control for the bids of both players in the previous period and 
for whether the decision maker won the prize in the previous period (the first period is not 
considered; see columns 3 and 4 of Tables 3 and 4), as is standard in the literature on repeated 
contest games (Ducheneaux et al., 2015). The results for males are not qualitatively affected (the 
p-value of the effect of the decision maker’s type increases slightly, from p=0.04 to p=0.06). 
However, among females, the effect of the decision maker’s type, which was non-significant in 
the first specification, now becomes significant: when we control for the previous period 
behaviors and outcome, L females bid more than H females (p=0.06, column 3, Table 3), 
indicating different responses to identical situations. The remaining results regarding main or 
interaction effects are not affected by the inclusion of these controls.  
In the last specification (columns 5 and 6), we also control for the decision maker’s age, intuitive 
(vs. reflective) cognitive style (Bosch-Domènech et al., 2014; Sheremeta, 2016), risk preferences 
(Brañas-Garza et al., 2018; Chowdhury et al., 2014) and body mass index (Fink et al. 2003). The 
results remain nearly identical to those obtained from columns 3 and 4 (among males, the p-
value of the decision maker’s DR type falls again below 5%; p=0.03), although we lose a non-
negligible number of observations due to missing values, especially among males (12 males and 
1 female are excluded from the analyses).10  
In sum, for both sexes, L-type subjects appear to bid more aggressively than H-type subjects as 
predicted by Hypothesis 1, but the effect is not significant across all model specifications for 
females. In addition, females bid significantly less when paired with a L than when paired with a 
H, in sharp contrast to Hypothesis 2, while the opposite is observed for males, in line with 
Hypothesis 2, although not significantly so.    
These results explain why, as shown in the left panel of Figures 3 and 4, the highest (lowest) bid 
levels are observed in conditions LL and LH (HH and HL) among males while, among females, 
highest (lowest) bid levels are observed in conditions LH and HH (LL and HL). 
 
																																								 																				
10 Note that, for males, running regression 1 with the sample of regression 5 (people without missing values in 
controls) yields coeff=14.901, p=0.04 for LØ (vs. HØ) and coeff=7.436, p=0.30 for ØL (vs. ØH), whereas 
regression 3 using the sample of regression 5 yields coeff=7.780, p=0.09 for LØ (vs. HØ) and coeff= 2.592, p=0.56 
for ØL (vs. ØH). For females, regression 1 using the sample of regression 5 yields coeff= 3.955, p=0.47 for LØ (vs. 
HØ) and coeff= -16.646, p<0.01 for ØL (vs. ØH), whereas regression 3 using the sample of regression 5 yields 
coeff= 5.982, p=0.03 for LØ (vs. HØ) and coeff= -11.044, p<0.01 for ØL (vs. ØH). Thus, the different samples 
result in similar estimates.  
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Table 4. Individual bids as a function of DR types (females) 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dep var: bidt 
      LØ (vs. HØ) 
 
2.840 8.816 5.410* 8.098* 5.862* 7.729* 
  
(5.644) (9.825) (2.846) (4.482) (2.993) (4.521) 
ØL (vs. ØH) 
 
-15.440*** -9.464 -10.428*** -7.740* -11.104*** -9.352* 
  
(5.632) (9.653) (2.914) (4.323) (3.094) (4.785) 
LØ X ØL 
  
-12.441 
 
-5.642 
 
-3.652 
   
(17.257) 
 
(7.252) 
 
(7.584) 
bidt-1 
   
0.417*** 0.415*** 0.414*** 0.413*** 
    
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
partner bidt-1 
  
0.228*** 0.226*** 0.222*** 0.220*** 
    
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) 
win prizet-1 
  
-3.975* -3.982* -4.432** -4.415** 
    
(2.084) (2.081) (2.139) (2.133) 
age 
     
-0.117 -0.046 
      
(0.391) (0.416) 
intuitive 
     
3.705 3.603 
      
(3.271) (3.283) 
risky 
     
-1.849 -2.279 
      
(4.035) (4.152) 
BMI 
     
-0.493 -0.477 
      
(0.494) (0.498) 
period 
 
0.063 0.063 -0.240 -0.240 -0.244 -0.244 
  
(0.376) (0.376) (0.161) (0.161) (0.166) (0.166) 
Constant 
 
80.639*** 78.846*** 33.839*** 33.300*** 46.748*** 44.543*** 
  
(5.732) (6.238) (6.802) (6.746) (14.423) (14.872) 
chi2 
 
18.530*** 18.732*** 129.072*** 131.164*** 162.238*** 171.664*** 
N 
 
1110 1110 1036 1036 1022 1022 
Notes:	Random-effects GLS estimates. See notes on Table 3 for a description of the variables used. Robust 
standard errors clustered on pairs are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Thus, overbidding is most commonly displayed by L in both sexes, but in different conditions: 
whereas for males maximal overbidding occurs in the condition in which two L compete 
(MLL=83.63), for females it occurs when a L competes against a H (FLH=88.16).Indeed, among 
males, the only significant difference between conditions is observed between LL and HH 
(MLL=83.63, MHH=61.26, p=0.05, all remaining comparisons yield p>0.17; Wald tests on the 
interaction coefficients in column 2, Table 3; similar results are obtained from columns 4 and 6). 
In the case of females, bids are higher in condition LH compared to LL (FLH=88.16, FLL=66.26, 
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p=0.045; Wald test on the interaction coefficients in column 2, Table 4) and HL (FHL=69.88, 
p<0.01); all remaining comparisons yield p>0.20.  
When the bids and outcomes from the previous period are accounted for, the results again change 
slightly among females (we report p-values obtained from column 4; those from column 6 are 
very similar). Whereas LH is still associated with higher bids than LL and HL (both p<0.01), 
now LH also shows higher bids than HH (FHH=79.35) and the latter higher bids than HL, 
although in both cases the comparison is only marginally significant (both p=0.07; the remaining 
comparisons yield p>0.21). 
Thus, regarding bidding behavior, we have shown that, 
For males: LL > HH and LØ > HØ. Hence L-types are more aggressive irrespectively of the 
composition of the pair (regarding FT). 
For females: LH > HL, LH > LL (and weakly LØ > HØ). Hence L-types behave more 
aggressively in front of H-types (mixed pairs) but not when they are matched together. Besides 
ØH > ØL, which means that any bidder (L or H) behave less aggressively in front of L-types. 
As a main result we conclude,  
Result 1 (bidding): Males act primarily according to their own type (L is more aggressive than H) 
and respond weakly to their opponent type while, in sharp contrast, females (re)act according their 
opponent type (H face more aggressive behavior than L) and weakly according to their own type. 
5.3. Payoff outcomes 
In this subsection we investigate how these differences in bidding behavior translate into 
outcomes. This is important because whereas the audience may be more interested in the effort 
provision in a competition, a designer might also take into account the payoff outcomes. Figures 
5 and 6 show the dynamics of the decision makers’ (realized) payoffs, respectively for males and 
females, using the same format of Figures 3 and 4.  
Contrary to the bidding results in the previous subsection, the opponent’s type is the main driver 
of males’ earnings (bottom right panel), whereas the decision maker’s type is the main driver of 
females’ earnings (top right panel). The regressions presented in column 1 of Tables 5 and 6 
indeed corroborate these observations (i.e., only controlling for period; note that controlling for 
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the decision maker’s characteristics beyond type makes no sense here given that payoffs depend 
on both players’ behavior). 
Figure 5. Dynamics of mean payoffs (males)
 
Note: Top right panel compares payoffs of L (LØ) vs. H (HØ) decision makers. Bottom right panel compares 
payoffs when the decision maker’s opponent is L (ØL) vs. H (ØH). Left panel displays payoffs across the four 
conditions (HH, HL, LH, LL). Small embedded figures show mean payoffs collapsed across periods (error bars 
display SEM clustered at the pair level). 
Figure 6. Dynamics of mean payoffs (females) 
 
Notes: Top right panel compares payoffs of L (LØ) vs. H (HØ) decision makers. Bottom right panel compares 
payoffs when the decision maker’s opponent is L (ØL) vs. H (ØH). Left panel displays payoffs across the four 
conditions (HH, HL, LH, LL). Small embedded figures show mean payoffs collapsed across periods (error bars 
display SEM clustered at the pair level). 
 
The payoffs of L and H males do not differ (MLØ=198.73, MHØ=197.00, p=0.76) but males earn 
significantly less when matched with L compared to H opponents (MØL=183.65, MØH=210.46, 
p<0.01). L females, on the other hand, earn (marginally) significantly more than H females 
(FLØ=198.83, FHØ=186.89, p=0.09) but the opponent’s type does not affect females’ payoffs 
(FØL=194.70, FØH=190.41, p=0.98).  
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Moreover, the interaction between the decision maker’s type and the opponent’s type (LØ x ØL) 
is non-significant for both males (p=0.73, column 2) and females (p=0.60). This means that, for 
either sex, the effect of the decision maker’s type on earnings is similar when playing against L 
and H opponents, whereas the effect of the opponent’s type is similar for L and H decision 
makers. 
In sum the results show how DR relate differently to payoffs across genders, males earn less 
against L opponents compared to against H opponents, whereas L females earn more than H 
females.  
Table 5. Realized outcomes as a function of DR types (males) 
  
1 2 3 4 
Dep var: payofft payofft win prizet relative payofft 
LØ (vs. HØ) 
 
2.411 5.051 0.188*** 58.576*** 
  
(7.772) (11.737) (0.073) (21.017) 
ØL (vs. ØH) 
 
-26.876*** -24.237** 
  
  
(7.630) (9.870) 
  LØ X ØL 
  
-5.582 
  
   
(16.158) 
  period 
 
-0.363 -0.363 -0.001 0.000 
  
(0.436) (0.436) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 
 
212.254*** 211.041*** 0.409*** -29.288*** 
  
(6.786) (8.003) (0.038) (10.508) 
chi2 
 
16.111*** 16.082*** 13.762*** 10.675*** 
N 
 
1050 1050 510 510 
Notes:	 Random-effects GLS estimates. Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. In 
columns 3 and 4, the sample is reduced to conditions HL and LH; thus LØ here refers to the comparison 
LH vs. HL. Robust standard errors clustered on pairs are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
As can be seen from the left panel of Figures 5 and 6, the above effects result in males’ payoffs 
being highest (lowest) in conditions LH and HH (LL and HL) while females’ highest (lowest) 
payoffs are observed in conditions LL and LH (HL and HH). Thus, among males, the highly 
competitive environment of condition LL is associated with the lowest absolute payoffs 
(MLL=183.37), very similar to that obtained by H-types when paired with L-types (MHL=183.90, 
p=0.96; Wald test on the interaction coefficients in column 2 of Table 5). In order to get high 
payoffs, both L and H males must be paired with H-types (MLH=213.19, MHH=208.14, which do 
not differ, p=0.67, and both yield higher earnings than in LL and HL, all p<0.04). On the other 
hand, given that there is no escalation of conflict between L females in condition LL, the 
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payoffs in this condition are the highest (FLL=200.47) and similar to those obtained by L 
females when paired with H-types (FLH=195.84). H females get low payoffs, irrespective of 
whether they are paired with L-types (FHL=184.12) or H-types (FHH=188.08). However, none of 
the pairwise comparisons between conditions reach significance for females (all p>0.16; Wald 
tests on the interaction coefficients in column 2 of Table 6). 
Table 6. Realized outcomes as a function of DR types (females) 
  
1 2 3 4 
Dep var: payofft payofft win prizet relative payofft 
LØ (vs. HØ) 
 
11.884* 7.755 0.167*** 23.439 
  
(7.023) (9.876) (0.056) (21.279) 
ØL (vs. ØH) 
 
0.165 -3.964 
  
  
(7.099) (11.187) 
  LØ X ØL 
  
8.597 
  
   
(16.473) 
  period 
 
-0.593 -0.593 -0.002 -0.000 
  
(0.410) (0.411) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 
 
191.583*** 192.822*** 0.424*** -11.719 
  
(5.400) (5.953) (0.027) (10.639) 
chi2 
 
4.107 4.180 9.177** 2.098 
N 
 
1110 1110 360 360 
Notes:	 Random-effects GLS estimates. Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. In 
columns 3 and 4, the sample is reduced to conditions HL and LH; thus LØ here refers to the comparison 
LH vs. HL. Robust standard errors clustered on pairs are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Thus, regarding payoffs, we have shown, 
For males: HH > HL, HH > LL, LH > HL, LH > LL and ØH > ØL. Earnings are lower when 
subjects are matched with L-Types. 
For females: LØ > HØ. L-types earn more money.  
As a main result we conclude, 
Result 2 (payoffs): L-type males make the contest more aggressive and consequently they do not 
earn high payoffs. Furthermore, they also make their counterparts to earn less. L-type females bid 
marginally more as well as earn marginally more than their H-type counterparts but cause no 
impact on opponents’ earnings. 
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5.4. Mixed pairs: Winning versus earning 
Competition seems to be a fundamental force for L-type males, especially when paired with 
another L-type. However, L-type females display high competitiveness mostly against H 
opponents (who do not respond very competitively). Since L and H-types are matched together 
in mixed pairs (HL and LH), it is interesting to analyze these conditions in greater detail. 
Specifically, we aim to investigate whether L-types (while matched with H-types) are more 
likely to win the prize and earn more than the rival; arguably, two main drivers of competition 
behavior (Sheremeta, 2013). Figures 7 and 8 display the dynamics of these two variables for H-
types and L-types while matched with each other, for males and females, respectively.  
The left panels of Figure 7 and 8 refer to the realized (ex-post) probability of getting the prize; 
which, combined with the previously analyzed bid levels, determines the subjects’ (realized) 
relative payoffs, depicted in the right panels. These diagrams show that overall both the ex-post 
probability of winning and the relative payoff is higher for the L-type than the H-type (for both 
male and female) when they are matched to each other.  
Figure 7. Relative comparisons: Winning and payoffs differences. HL/LH (males) 
 
Notes: Left panel refers to the decision maker’s (realized) probability of getting the prize. Right panel refers to the 
decision maker’s relative payoff. Small-embedded figures show means collapsed across periods (error bars display 
SEM clustered at the pair level). 
The regression analyses are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Tables 5 and 6 for males and females, 
respectively. For both sexes, L-types are more likely to get the prize than H-types (nearly 60% 
and 40% on average, respectively, p<0.01 for both males and females; column 3 in Tables 5 and 
6). Also, L males earn relatively more than their H counterparts, in particular, they obtain about 
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29 tokens more (p<0.01, column 4). The effect is also positive for L females (12 tokens) but not 
significant (p=0.27). 
Figure 8. Relative comparisons: Winning and payoffs differences. HL/LH (females) 
 
Notes: Left panel refers to the decision maker’s (realized) probability of getting the prize. Right panel refers to the 
decision maker’s relative payoff. Small-embedded figures show means collapsed across periods (error bars display 
SEM clustered at the pair level). 
The following result summarize this section: 
Result 3 (mixed pairs): L-type males win more often and earn more than their H counterparts. L-
type females win more often but not necessarily earn more. 
6. DR and preference mechanisms 
From the above results, it is still not clear through which mechanism the observed behavioral 
differences turn out. In the experimental contest literature several behavioral and preference-
related aspects are indicated to be responsible for players’ high bids.  It is possible that the effect 
of FT exposure works through such channels. Sheremeta (2013) mentions several such 
mechanisms including the joy of winning, social preference, error, risk preference etc. It is 
unlikely that the difference in bidding by DR is due to error in our experiment. Also, we control 
for risk preferences. So, two main aspects through which DR may affect bidding are the joy of 
winning and social preference, which are closely related to the likelihood of getting the prize and 
to the relative payoffs analyzed, respectively. In this section we investigate both. 
6.1. Joy of winning 
It is noted in the literature that non-monetary value of win may explain overbidding in contest 
experiments (Sheremeta, 2010). It might be that L DR players value the win more than their H 
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DR counterparts and this leads them to exert higher conflict effort. In such a case let us denote 
the psychological prize value for a L DR player as 𝑉! and that for a H DR player as 𝑉! with 𝑉! > 𝑉!. Also, denote the effort by a L DR against a L DR as 𝑒!!, effort by a L DR against a H 
DR as 𝑒!", effort by a H DR against a H DR as 𝑒!!, and effort by a H DR against a L DR as 𝑒!". 
It can then be shown easily, following standard procedures, that the Nash equilibrium efforts are 𝑒!" = !!!!!!!!!! ! and 𝑒!" = !!!!!!!!!! !. Furthermore, 𝑒!! = !!!  and 𝑒!! = !!! . Hence, given 𝑉! > 𝑉! 
we get:  𝑒!! > 𝑒!" > 𝑒!! > 𝑒!". 
A graphical representation of this is given in Figure 9. The red lines are the best response of 
player 1 whereas the blue lines are the best response of player 2. The best responses inside 
correspond to the case when the player is H DR, and the ones outside correspond to the case 
when the player is L DR. The resulting rankings are obvious and are indeed similar to what we 
observe for males. 
In our empirical strategy, we estimate “joy of winning” for the different types following the 
methodology of Herrmann and Orzen (2008). In contrast to Herrmann and Orzen (2008), our 
participants did not respond to specific bids of their opponents (strategy method), thus we base 
our estimates on the concept of myopic best response (Fallucchi et al. 2013, Lim et al. 2014). 
That is, we assume that individuals best respond to their opponent’s bid in the previous period, 
which seems to be a reasonable assumption (Rockenbach and Waligora 2016).  
Figure 9. Equilibria with joy of winning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑒!	
𝑒!	
0	
𝑒!!(𝑒!)	𝑒!!(𝑒!)	
𝑒!!(𝑒!)	
𝑒!!(𝑒!)	
𝑒!!!	𝑒!!! 	𝑒!!"	 𝑒!!" 	
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In particular, to incorporate the idea that players enjoy winning the prize per se we assume that 
the value of the prize is perceived by the subjects to be different (i.e., higher) than its objective 
value of 180. The myopic best response function for any partner bidt-1 between 0 and 180 is 
given by 
bidt = 𝑃 ∗ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑑!!! − 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑑!!! (4) 
where P is the perceived value of the prize. We estimate the value of P using the following 
econometric model: 
zi,t = θ1xi,t + εi (5) 
where zi,t = 𝑏𝚤𝑑! + 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑑!,!!!, θ1 = 𝑃 and xi,t = 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑑!,!!!.  
Performing this estimation separately for both the L and H subsamples we obtain,  
• for males: 𝑃!Ø = 352.11, 𝑃!Ø = 295.29 
• for females: 𝑃!Ø = 336.48, 𝑃!Ø = 337.40 
Comparing these values with the prize value, 180, we find that on average subjects notably 
overvalue the prize. Among males, L-types value the prize 95.6% more than its actual value, 
while H-types value it 64.05% more. Among women there is a huge overvaluation but virtually 
no differences between L-types (86.9%) and H-types (87.4%). 11  Although again the 
methodological differences do not allow us to directly compare these estimates to those of 
Herrmann and Orzen (2008), note that their estimations yield overvaluations of up to about 50%. 
Result 4: L-type males have higher joy of winning than H-types. The joy of winning is not 
different for L-type and H-type females. 
6.2. Social preferences  
It is shown in the experimental contest literature that spitefulness carries a significant behavioral 
role in effort provision (Chowdhury et al., 2018). Hence, it may also be possible that the 
difference in conflict behavior for different DR emerges through heterogeneous social 
preferences – especially spite. To estimate such social preferences parameters from a generalized 
																																								 																				
11 Note however that, as in Herrmann and Orzen (2008), this procedure does not allow us to test whether estimated 
differences are statistically significant because we cannot obtain dispersion measures of the values, but only central 
measures. The same applies to the social preference estimations in the next subsection. 
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version of Fehr-Schmidt (1999) as introduced below, we estimate the relevant parameters α and 
β. 
𝑈! 𝑒! , 𝑒! = 𝜋! − 𝛼max 𝜋! − 𝜋! , 0 − 𝛽max 𝜋! − 𝜋! , 0  (6) 
Where 𝑈! is the utility and 𝜋! is the own payoff; whereas 𝛼 reflects disadvantageous inequality 
aversion (envy) and 𝛽 reflects advantageous inequality aversion (compassion). A high positive 𝛼 
combined with a high negative 𝛽 indicates a high level of spite, that is, a high willingness to 
reduce others’ payoffs (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008). 
Here, theoretical predictions are not as straightforward as in the case of the joy of winning 
because there are two parameters to be considered and therefore many possible combinations can 
arise. However, let us offer equilibrium predictions for the extreme case in which L-DR 
individuals display maximal spite, i.e., α=∞ and β=-∞, while H-DR individuals display no spite, 
i.e., α=0 and β=0. In this case, L players only care about the relative payoffs, disregarding their 
own absolute payoff, whereas H players only care about their own absolute payoff. Following 
Mago et al. (2016), the symmetric Nash equilibrium for relative-payoff maximizing players, that 
is, for LL pairs in our experiment assuming the above, would be  𝑒!! = 90 whereas, trivially, 
that for HH pairs would be 𝑒!! = 45. In mixed pairs, equilibrium efforts should be in between 
these two values. Recall that peaks at bids of 90 and 45 tokens were recursively observed in 
overall bid distributions (top panel of Figure 2) and, in particular, these predictions seem to fit in 
nicely the case of males. 
Following Herrman and Orzen (2008), we consider the following myopic best response function: 
𝑏𝑖𝑑! = 1 + 𝛼 − 𝛽1 − 𝛽 𝑃 ∗ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑑!!! − 2(𝛼 + 𝛽)1 − 𝛽 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑑!!!! − 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑑!!! (7) 
 
 
where the parameters α and β are estimated from the model: 𝑧!,!  =  𝜃!𝑥!" +  𝜃!𝑥!"! +  𝜀!, with 𝑧!,! = 𝑏𝚤𝑑! + 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑑!,!!! ! , 𝜃! = (1 +  𝛼 –  𝛽)𝑃/(1 –  𝛽) , 𝜃! = −2( 𝛼 +  𝛽)/(1–  𝛽)  
and 𝑥!" = 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑑!,!!!.  
Regarding envy, this estimation yields,  
• for males: 𝛼!Ø = 2.30, 𝛼!Ø = -0.13 
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• for females: 𝛼!Ø = 3.02, 𝛼!Ø = 0.84  
This shows that exposure to FT impacts on both males and females: L-type subjects are more 
envious than H-type subjects irrespective of the gender. Note that Herrmann and Orzen (2008) 
estimate envy values of up to 1.55 in their experiments. 
We repeat the same estimation regarding compassion. This estimation yields,  
• for males: 𝛽!Ø = -6.62, 𝛽!Ø = -1.91 
• for females: 𝛽!Ø = -9.16, 𝛽!Ø = -4.24  
Here we also observe a strong effect of FT. Both male and female L-types enjoy advantageous 
inequality (i.e., display stronger negative compassion) more than H-types, but females seem to 
be more spiteful than males (see also Espín et al. 2017). Note that Herrmann and Orzen (2008) 
estimate negative compassion values of up to -1.40 in their experiments. The strongly negative 
compassion of females may explain why they are more aggressive against less aggressive 
opponents (i.e., against H types).  
There are several reasons why these results are important. First, these are new results in the 
literature. While joy of winning and spiteful preferences were documented earlier in the contest 
literature, gender differences in these behavioral mechanisms were not. Second, these results 
show that the exposure to FT may affect one’s conflict behavior through his or her joy of 
winning or spitefulness. Finally, it shows that the gender difference in conflict behavior can be 
traced into gender differences in spitefulness.  
7. Discussion 
Our results contribute to the growing literature on the effect of biological factors on behavior in 
competitive settings. Specifically, we provide controlled evidence that dyadic competition yields 
very different outcomes depending on the FT ‘types’ of those interacting. One of the potential 
confounding factors that our study controls for is ability – ruling out the explanation that 
differences in behavior and outcomes are driven by differences in (unobservable) ability that 
correlate with FT exposure. We thus extend the literature on how FT relates to individuals’ 
preferences for, and outcomes in, competitive settings such as sports, financial trading and 
entrepreneurship (Manning and Taylor, 2001; Bennett et al., 2010; Sapienza et al., 2009; 
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Nicolaou et al., 2017). Furthermore, our study is the first to perform a controlled match of 
different FT (DR) types.  
We find that L (DR) type males expend higher effort, but do not earn more than H type males. 
Anybody matched with L type males earns less than when matched with H type males. In 
addition, all females exert more effort against H types, and consequently H type females earn 
less than L type females. To explain these results, we estimate two ‘behavioral’ models of 
preferences: one in which subjects can derive extra utility from winning (“joy of winning”, 
Sheremeta, 2010) and a generalized version of Fehr-Schmidt social preferences. We find that our 
results can be partially explained by high joy of winning and high spitefulness (positive envy and 
negative compassion) for L type males, and high spitefulness for L type females.  
Our main result thus shows that males act primarily according to their own type and react weakly 
to their opponent’s type while, in sharp contrast, females (re)act primarily according their 
opponent’s type. Although gender differences in attitudes toward competition have been 
documented before (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), our findings suggest that (i) biological 
factors matter for both genders and (ii) although the observed competitive behavior is to some 
sense intuitive (L type men being more aggressive; H type women encountering more aggression 
from others), men and women have a fundamentally different approach to dyadic competition. 
Interestingly, our main result may be related to Croson and Gneezy’s (2009) observation that 
females’ behavior is more context dependent. It may be that the type of an opponent in 
competitive situations, as inferred from their actions, is treated the same as contextual factors. Our 
finding that females react according to their opponent’s type, in turn, can explain some of the 
existing observations in the literature such that: females reacting more than males in identity 
related conflict (Chowdhury et al., 2016), or females exerting more effort against other females, 
but males not reacting to gender (Mago and Razzolini, 2018). 
Our findings may help explain outcomes in certain professional settings, especially those 
dominated by a single gender and/or favored by certain biological types. Financial trading and 
professional sports, two male-dominated profession that disproportionately attract L DR types, 
would be predicted to feature aggressive competition for a win, for example. This prediction is in 
line with anecdotal evidence, as well as reports of cases where a “win at all costs” mentality has 
led some competitors to breaking rules. Because we also find that L type males compete more 
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fiercely than (and out-earn) H type males in direct competition (i.e., in mixed pairs), this may 
explain why L type males are more likely to prevail in certain settings. Our results also matter 
from from a designer point of view. When a designer is interested in either competitive balance, 
or maximizing or minimizing total effort exerted in a contest, our findings suggest that biological 
factors such as FT and gender are important aspects to consider while matching contestants and 
setting the rules of the game. 
One potential caveat we wish to point out is that it is currently unclear whether selection into 
different levels of FT is independent of other indirect influences on behavior. Is it, for example, 
possible that physiological characteristics of the mother affect both the effective level of 
testosterone exposure in utero and aspects of the child's upbringing? Whether this is merely a 
theoretical possibility or a factor of significance is important, as it affects the interpretation of the 
DR as a proxy for strictly biological factors. 
The relationship between prenatal development, competition and conflict is a fruitful area for 
further research. Follow-up studies could look at wider consequences for society, for example by 
asking how FT affects group conflict and coalition formation. We have already noted the findings 
of Cecchi and Duchoslav (2018) on civil conflict in Uganda. More generally, it will be important 
to consider how biological factors affect behavior in common social settings, such as networks 
and organizations. For example, Kovarik et al. (2017) find that L (DR) type males are more likely 
to occupy central positions in social networks, which arguably puts them in a privileged position 
for information exchange and therefore access to resources. It will be important to understand if 
such benefits do indeed materialize, as well as the role that competition (e.g. leadership contests) 
and conflict (e.g. for resources or influence) fulfil in these contexts. 
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Appendix: Experimental instructions 
 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS  
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. This experiment consists of two 
unrelated parts. Instructions for the first part are given next and the instructions for the second part 
will be provided after the first part of the experiment is finished. 
The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you 
can earn an appreciable amount of money. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have 
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come 
to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. 
We expect and appreciate your cooperation. 
Experimental Currency is used in the experiment and your decisions and earnings will be 
recorded in tokens. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. Tokens 
earned from both parts of the experiment will be converted to Pound Sterling at a rate of: 
_2_ tokens = _1_ Pence (£0.01). 
 
 
NB: Please do not write on these instruction sheets 
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INSTRUCTIONS – PART 1 
 
YOUR DECISION 
This part of the experiment consists of 15 decision-making periods. At the beginning, you will be 
randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 2 participants – you and someone else in the 
room. The composition of your group will remain the same for all 15 periods. You will not know 
who the other group member is at any time.  
 
Each period you will receive an initial endowment of 180 tokens. Each period, you may bid for a 
reward of 180 tokens. You may bid any number between 0 and 180 (including 0.1 decimal points). 
An example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
For each bid there is an associated cost equal to the bid itself. The cost of your bid is: 
Cost of your bid = Your bid 
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The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participant in 
your group bids, the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, your chance of receiving 
the reward is given by your bid divided by the sum of the 2 bids in your group: 
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Chance of receiving the reward =  Your bid 
		
Sum of all 2 bids in your group 		
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
You can consider the amounts of the bids to be equivalent to numbers of lottery tickets. The 
computer will draw one ticket from those entered by you and the other participant, and assign the 
reward to one of the participants through a random draw. If you receive the reward, your earnings for 
the period are equal to your endowment of 180 tokens plus the reward of 180 tokens minus the cost 
of your bid. If you do not receive the reward, your earnings for the period are equal to your 
endowment of 180 tokens minus the cost of your bid. In other words, your earnings are: 
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
If you receive the reward: Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Cost of your bid = 180 + 180 – your bid 
		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
		
If you do not receive the reward: Earnings = Endowment - Cost of your bid = 180 – your bid 
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
 
An Example (for illustrative purposes only) 
Let’s say participant 1 bids 30 tokens and participant 2 bids 45 tokens. Therefore, the computer 
assigns 30 lottery tickets to participant 1 and 45 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer 
randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 75 (30 + 45). As you can see, participant 2 has the highest 
chance of receiving the reward: 60% = 45/75 and participant 1 has 40% = 30/75 chance of receiving 
the reward. 
Assume that the computer assigns the reward to participant 1, then the earnings of participant 1 for 
the period are 330 = 180 + 180 – 30, since the reward is 180 tokens and the cost of the bid is 30. 
Similarly, the earnings of participant 2 are 135 = 180 – 45.  
At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of the 2 bids in your group, your reward, and your 
earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen 
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is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet (provided 
separately) under the appropriate heading. 
 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
At the beginning of this part of the experiment you will be randomly grouped with another 
participant to form a 2-person group. You will not be told which of the participants in this room are 
assigned to which group.  
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly choose 5 of the 15 periods for 
actual payment for this part of experiment. You will be paid the earnings in these 5 periods. These 
earnings in tokens will be converted to cash at the exchange rate of _2_ tokens to _1_ Pence (£0.01) 
and will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
 
Are there any questions? 
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QUIZ 
NB: Please do not write on these sheets – try to answer the question for yourself, then check the 
answer on page 6. 
1. Does group composition change across periods in this part of the experiment?   
Ans.       Yes            No    
 
2. What is the value of 1 token in Pence?   
Ans.       1 Pence               ½ Pence            9 Pence   
 
Questions 3 to 6 apply to the following information. 
 
In a given period, suppose the bids by participants in your group are as follows. 
 
Bid of participant 1: 55 tokens 
Bid of participant 2: 70 tokens 
 
3.  What is the chance that participant 1 will receive the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________  
 
4.  What is the chance that participant 2 will receive the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________  
 
 
5. If you are Participant 1 and you did not receive the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. ___________ tokens 
 
6. If you are Participant 2 and you received the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. ___________ tokens 
 
EXPLANATIONS FOR QUIZ ANSWERS  
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1. Does group composition change across periods in this part of the experiment?  
Ans.       No 
2. What is the value of 1 token in Pence?   
Ans.       ½ Pence         
3.  What is the chance that participant 1 will receive the reward?    
Ans.       55 out of 125. 
 
4.  What is the chance that participant 2 will receive the reward?    
Ans.       70 out of 125. 
 
5. If you are Participant 1 and you did not receive the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. 125 tokens   (= Endowment – bid = 180 – 55) 
 
6. If you are Participant 2 and you received the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. 290 tokens   (= Endowment + Reward – Bid = 180 + 180 – 70) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
